



The Death of Hope? Affirmation in the Anthropocene
Chandler, D.
 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in 
Globalizations.
The final definitive version is available online:
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rglo20/current
© 2018 Taylor & Francis
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
1The Death of Hope? Affirmation in the Anthropocene
Draft paper for Globalizations special issue, ‘The Politics 
of Hope’, edited by Marjo Lindroth and
Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen
David Chandler (University of Westminster) d.chandler@wmin.ac.uk
Abstract
This article engages with the imaginary that the great age of hope as critique 
is finally at an end. For hope’s detractors, the Anthropocene is imagined to be 
a gain in intelligibility at the price of the eclipse of both the modernist 
imaginary (with its optimistic telos of universal knowledge and progress) and 
its romantic critical counterpart of re-enchantment and hope. It appears that 
hope may have no place in the Anthropocene if re-enchantment is no longer 
possible. Man can then never be returned to the world or somehow reunited 
with nature (internally and/or externally). As some contemporary theorists are 
delighted to inform us, it seems possible that we will lose the belief that the 
world was ever there, in some way, ‘for us’ or that we can imagine moving 
beyond Enlightenment assumptions and returning the human, in less modern 
ways, to perhaps hear and heed the needs of our non-human planetary kin. It 
is argued here that, for hope to survive, it is necessary that the world be 
imagined as one in which it is possible for humans to find a sense of purpose 
or meaning in the world. 
Introduction
Hope is not a straightforward category to engage with. In popular discourse, 
hope is often confused with an optimistic outlook, as in ‘hoping for the best’, 
but in the history of philosophical thought hope has often been seen as an 
affective desire for alternative possible outcomes, which is not necessarily 
linked to any belief in probabilities (SEP, 2017). While standard accounts of 
hope link it with irrationality, Kant is the first major thinker to engage with hope 
as a complex category, in fact as a categorical imperative to believe that there 
is reason in the world, enabling the possibility of progress to a better world, 
even if we cannot perceive this empirically; thus hope is constructed as a 
moral duty in the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1970: p.174). It is this Kantian 
framing - where hope is constructed as rational and necessary but neither 
grounded in positivist, scientific knowledge of possibilities nor in religious 
belief in any transcendental moral truths - that was to inform a wide range of 
post-Marxist and Frankfurt School critical theorists, perhaps the most 
influential being Ernest Bloch, who forwarded an immanent and processual 
ontology of hope as the state of being always ‘in-possibility’ (Bloch, 1986: 
p.202). This article suggests that it is this Kantian or critical hope, which is 
held to be reaching exhaustion under the aegis of the Anthropocene.
2If the Anthropocene spells the end of the modernist imaginary of progress and 
of the centrality of the human as somehow above and separate from nature, 
imaginaries of alternative possibilities can be less likely to be understood as 
critical but rather as a reactionary call to restore the human to its former 
hegemonic position. This position, is understood here in terms of the 
affirmation of the Anthropocene, seen as liberating critical thought from the 
constraints of modernist or anthropocentric thinking (see further, Latour, 2013; 
Morton, 2013; Tsing, 2015; Stengers, 2015; Haraway, 2016; Chandler, 2018). 
In which case, perhaps ‘hope’ will be seen to have been an unchecked 
privilege of the moderns? To be more precise, perhaps ‘hope’ was the 
privilege of critical theorists, connected to the Frankfurt School tradition, who 
imagined that there would be a second chance after modernity; after the 
Enlightenment/modernist disenchantment of the world (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997) and the hegemonic divide between culture and nature 
(Latour, 1993)? 
These are the questions this article seeks to engage with. In doing so, it will 
draw out the links between the affirmative assumptions of the Anthropocene 
and arguments asserting the death of hope today. The focus is upon 
highlighting what is unique about the affirmation of the Anthropocene and 
what increasingly makes this body of thought distinct from critical, neo-Marxist 
or cultural approaches towards hope in modernity: the fact that the critique of 
modernity is today not built on the basis that modernity was dehumanising, 
separating man from nature, but its inversion: that modernity was not 
dehumanising enough (Bryant, 2011; Brassier, 2007; Colebrook, 2014; 
Povinelli, 2016). 
The death of hope has been called for, on the basis that there is no longer the 
possibility of alternatives to the world as it exists; i.e., that it is not possible to 
find reason in the world beyond that of the modernist imaginary. It is the lack 
of reason in the world itself that means there is no choice other than the 
affirmation of what exists (Brassier, 2007: p.238). For theorists advocating the 
end of hope, the affirmative assumptions of the Anthropocene do not raise the 
possibility of alternatives - any alternative would merely reconstitute the 
‘hopeful’ view of man as a knowing subject separated from the world. The 
affirmative politics of the Anthropocene insist upon the end of hope and 
acceptance that there can be ‘no happy ending’ (Tsing, 2015: p.21). The price 
of the rejection of hope is held to be the liberation of thought and practice from 
modernist constraints. As Danowski and Viveiros de Castro note, today we 
appear surrounded by a cacophony of contemporary voices, with new and 
sophisticated arguments, all determined to ‘end the world’ and even 
advocating that the ‘real’ world, ‘in its radical contingency and 
purposelessness, has to be “realized” against Reason and Meaning’ 
(Danowski and Viveiros de Castro, 2017: p.3). There is little doubt that these 
views are powerfully expressive of the underlying sentiments driving the 
affirmative assumptions of the Anthropocene.
Key to the asserted end of hope is the contemporary perception of the failure 
of modernity. The affirmation of the Anthropocene thus appears to be 
overdetermined. The arrival of climate change and global warming, indicating 
3a new set of problems and potential limits to progress and development, 
seems to have coincided with an already existing exhaustion of the modernist 
episteme, creating a potent political dynamic. As Claire Colebrook (2017: p.7) 
notes: ‘The Anthropocene seems to arrive just as a whole new series of 
materialisms, vitalisms, realisms, and inhuman turns require us to think about 
what has definite and forceful existence regardless of our sense of world.’ In 
fact, Richard Grusin (2017: p.viii) argues that ‘the concept of the 
Anthropocene has arguably been implicit in feminist and queer theory for 
decades’. This is why, for many theorists, the Anthropocene appears as 
something that is non-negotiable. Jessi Lehman and Sara Nelson, for 
example, argue that: ‘In the Anthropocene, we are always already living in the 
aftermath of the event.’ The delayed dynamics of climate change mean that 
its impact is unavoidable while the entanglement of human and geological 
factors mean that human agency can never again be imagined in modernist 
ways (Lehman and Nelson, 2014: p.444). Stephanie Wakefield asserts that: 
‘the crisis is the age. It is on this terrain of an exhausted paradigm – both 
historical and metaphysical – that a battle is underway.’ (Wakefield, 2014: 
p.451) This sense of modernity as ‘an exhausted paradigm’ has enabled the 
affirmative politics of the Anthropocene to rapidly cohere and appear to be 
powerfully vindicated in every extreme weather event or unexpected accident 
or disaster. 
In answer to the question of ‘Why affirm the Anthropocene?’ The same ready-
made explanation is repeated over and over, regularly wheeled out 
everywhere from newspaper articles to graduate presentations, conference 
papers and scientific journal articles: the Anthropocene is alleged to liberate 
us from the prison and constraints of modernist or Enlightenment thought, 
which has been revealed to be too linear, too binary, too abstract, too 
reductionist, too subject- or human-centred, too rationalist, too instrumentalist, 
too hubristic, too Euro-centric, too anthropocentric, too totalizing… add any 
other popular trope of your choice. The speed and ease of the (at least 
rhetorically asserted) rejection of modernist understandings is something that 
takes more explanation than merely the finding that the earth might be 
entering a new geological epoch.
The desire for affirmation and the rejection of hope takes a particular and 
highly contemporary form. Unlike earlier critiques of modernity (Bennett, 
2011), the affirmative political framings of the Anthropocene do not seek to 
return the human to the world, to ‘re-enchant’ the world after modernity’s 
passing. Rather than becoming ‘at home’ in the Anthropocene, the opposite 
movement is at play: the earth is understood to be more alien to us, more 
inaccessible and stranger than we could have imagined. Counter-intuitively, it 
is this alienation from the world, the world as lacking in meaning for man (the 
world as a ‘desert’ in Arendtian terms, see 2005: pp.201-4), which provides 
the affirmation of the Anthropocene and distinguishes it from earlier, more 
hopeful, critiques of the modernist paradigm. The Anthropocene is not merely 
the recognition of the importance of climate change or global warming; but 
neither is it merely a critique of modernity: for a growing number of theorists, it 
is affirmed as a new framework for understanding and acting in a world, which 
can never be considered a ‘home’.
4This article is organised in four sections. The next section introduces the 
problematic of hope in the Anthropocene, highlighting that critical theory 
approaches tend to see the Anthropocene within a discourse of hope. The 
second section draws out the importance of understanding the distinct mode 
of contemporary affirmation, which rather than seeking to return man to the 
world, emphasises the impossibility of finding meaning in the world. It is this 
inverting of critical understandings that enables the affirmative politics of the 
Anthropocene to move beyond discourses of hope. The third section expands 
on this to consider how some contemporary theoretical approaches articulate 
life without the possibility of hope. The final section illustrates this point 
through its reflection in policy-discourses; in this case, the shifting 
understanding of resilience and adaptation as being problematic and 
counterproductive the more the Anthropocene is accepted 
Hope and the Anthropocene
Whereas contemporary theorists, such as Timothy Morton and Bruno Latour, 
are happy to point out that climate scientists and climate change itself have 
done more to shake the modern episteme than critical theorists and the 
entirety of continental philosophy (see, for example, Latour, 2013: p.77; 
Morton, 2013: p.181), it is suggested here, that the Anthropocene is affirmed 
precisely because it does something that critical theory had not merely not 
achieved but, more importantly, had not attempted. Thus claims regarding the 
end of hope and the affirmation of the Anthropocene cannot be properly 
understood without a clarification of the concept of hope’s relationship to the 
critical thought of modernity. 
For the modernist world, especially for the Marxist Left, there was little need 
for hope when science and technology seemed to assure a positive future: 
there was always the possibility a ‘happy ending’, through the development 
and extension of the productive forces, with the removal of capitalist forms of 
exploitation and oppression, instituting an alternative future based on reason 
and technological development (Pachter, 1974). This level of confidence in 
the promise of modernist progress increasingly dwindled throughout the 
twentieth century, with the experience of fascism, the purges of Stalin’s 
Russia, world war, the Holocaust and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. This critical disillusionment was expressed well in the pessimism of 
critical theory of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School, whose approach was much 
less ‘scientific’ and instead relied on less rationalist framings of ‘hope’, than 
did the Marxism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, shifting 
focus to (psycho)analytical problems of the instrumentalisation of knowledge 
and social construction of meaning (for example, Jeffries, 2016). 
Thus it is clear that, as stated in the introduction above, hope understood as a 
philosophical concept or category, should not be confused with the common 
sense expression of hope as meaning merely optimism or as having a 
positive outlook on life. For the Frankfurt School tradition, critical hope 
provides an alternative approach to discredited Marxist and modernist 
scientific and technical frameworks of human progress, through giving 
5meaning to a world constructed in more immanent and processual ways. As 
Bloch argued, against Bergson, for hope to exist, this process of becoming 
could not be arbitrary, a ‘sheer aimless infinity and incessant inchangeability’ 
(1986: p.140), but draw upon an agential ‘bottom-up’ or immanent alternative 
way of creative being, more attuned to new possibilities. 
The new epoch of the Anthropocene can be seen as a continuation of a trend 
towards a more pessimistic view of the possibility of progress on behalf of 
radical or critical theorists and commentators. To the point where, today, it is 
no longer necessary for critical approaches to promise even the possibility of 
an alternative ‘happy ending’ (Tsing, 2015). Thus hope itself is often 
understood to be problematic and increasingly reactionary, as its impossibility 
becomes clearer. This radical malaise is captured well in Fredric Jameson’s 
often cited observation ‘that the end of the world is more easily imaginable 
than the end of capitalism’ (Jameson, 2003: p.73). As far as there is a shift 
from a critical focus on capitalism as a specific system of social relations to 
the problem of reflection upon human forms of social existence more 
generally (see, for example, Wark, 2015; Chakrabarty, 2009; Ghosh, 2016),  
the affirmation of the Anthropocene seems both to build on and, importantly, 
to differ from the hopeful critical theory tradition of the Frankfurt School. 
Perhaps one of the most ‘hopeful’ or traditionally ‘critical’ approaches to the 
Anthropocene is that of Bonneuil and Fressoz’s Shock of the Anthropocene 
(2016), in which they argue that the problematic of the Anthropocene ought 
not to be captured by the scientific and technical expertise of eco-modernisers 
with their conceptions of ‘spaceship earth’ or ‘interplanetary boundaries’. They 
particularly emphasise the importance of the legacy of the Frankfurt School, 
who first popularised a Left-leaning and critical understanding that the 
problem was not capitalism per se but rather the modernist episteme itself, in 
its development of technological and instrumentalist reason at the expense of 
relational and communal sensitivities (2016: p.281). What is interesting about 
Bonneuil and Fressoz’s ‘left’ critique of the Anthropocene is precisely the way 
they tie it to modernist drives and understandings in order to maintain a 
hopeful and critical approach. While critical of modernity, Bonneuil and 
Fressoz seek to follow the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School in returning 
man to a human-centred world of meaning and progress. 
This is a point of fundamental importance regarding a critical stance to the 
affirmative politics of the Anthropocene. The critical contemporary theorists 
who affirm the new politics of the Anthropocene, may share some of Bonneuil 
and Fressoz’s distain for modernity and their more psychotherapeutic and 
cultural critique of hegemonic ideas, but they take a fundamentally different 
stance towards hope. Rather than mourning man’s separation from the world, 
the ‘post-critical’ (Felski, 2015; Anker and Felski, 2017) politics of 
Anthropocene affirmation, celebrates it and wishes to take this as its 
ontological starting point. The modernist episteme is critiqued from the 
opposite aspect today, that it is too hopeful, that it is too humanist or human-
centred, not that it is alienating and dehumanizing. It is for this reason that, for 
these theorists, there is no demand for the human to be returned to a world of 
meaning, allegedly denied it by modernist rationalism and instrumentality, but 
6rather for the human to be expunged further. This distinction, which is 
fundamental for those concerned with the future of hope in the Anthropocene, 
will be expanded upon further in the next two sections. 
Frankfurt School Redux?
Perhaps the classic critical work on the problem of modernity is the one that 
established the reputation of critical theory and the Frankfurt School, Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s (1997 [1947]) Dialectic of Enlightenment. For 
them, modernist thinking was dehumanising: the Enlightenment was 
problematic in denaturalising the world and the human, and reducing, 
universalising, and equalising the experience of the world. For critical theory, 
the Enlightenment was problematic and oppressive rather than liberating. The 
Enlightenment view of reason contained its own seeds of destruction. The 
Enlightenment as the modern era was re-read as a history of the separation of 
humanity from nature through the power of rationality – based on the 
subsumption of difference to the rule of equivalences, casting the 
Enlightenment as a totalitarian project with no inherent limits (1997: p.6): 
‘Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dissimilar comparable 
by reducing it to abstract quantities.’ (1997: p.7) For Adorno and Horkheimer:
What was different is equalized. That is the verdict which critically 
determines the limits of possible experience. The identity of everything 
with everything else is paid for in that nothing may at the same time be 
identical with itself. Enlightenment… excises the incommensurable… 
[u]nder the levelling domination of abstraction. (1997: pp.12-13)
Rather than a process of progress and reason, the Enlightenment was seen 
as a machinic, deadening, reduction of the world and of the human individual. 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, this was a world with no possibility of an outside 
as everything was subsumed into equivalence through conceptual abstraction 
(1997: p.16). In other words, this meant that nothing new could ever occur as 
‘the process is always decided from the start’; even unknown values could still 
be put into equations, dissolving the world into mathematics. Everything new 
was thus already predetermined, producing a world of ‘knowledge without 
hope’ (1997: pp.27-28).
Thus the history of civilisation was the attempt to bring the outside under 
control through the extension of equivalence; Mauss’s gift economy and pre-
modern magic and sacrifice being early versions of the exchange of non-
equivalents (Mauss, 2002). The performative exchange of non-equivalents 
then led to the reflection of equivalence in thought – conceptual subsumption 
– through the ratio, i.e. the proportion of conceptual equivalence. Under 
capitalism this process was formalised further, in both practice and in thought, 
through money as the universal equivalent of exchange and through the 
abstractions of democracy and universal rights and the development of 
science and the digital (see also Sohn-Rethel, 1978). The modernist project 
was thus one of the extension of the imaginary of control, with the 
development of subject/object and human/nature binaries. Critical theory and 
its inheritors thereby sought to challenge the dominance of this modernist 
7imaginary, questioning hierarchies of reason and progress and contesting the 
grounds upon which equivalences and subsumptions of difference were 
established.
The Frankfurt School sought to address the crisis of modernist thinking 
understood as a crisis for the Left, i.e. for those who aspired to critically 
advocate alternative worlds and social progress. The question at the heart of 
their work was that of the possibility for critical thought after the Holocaust and 
Hiroshima. If the Holocaust and Hiroshima were symptoms of rationalist 
thinking and technological progress, what possibility was there for progress? 
The alternative to the totalizing and ‘top-down’ engineering and technical 
solutions of modernity was that of critical hope, based not on humanist hubris 
but a return of the human to the world. 
Bonneuil and Fressoz therefore provide a contemporary framing of this, 
seeing modernity as the failure to appreciate humanity as part of a material, 
natural world and seeking to heal the ‘metabolic rift’ (Wark, 2015) caused by 
the extraction of ‘cheap nature’ (Moore, 2015), restoring a more holistic 
framework for politics. For these critical thinkers it is the political struggle 
against modernist thought, which is the emancipatory aspect of the 
Anthropocene. The hopeful and critical approach thus seeks to reduce the 
separation of man from the world to political problems of perception and 
projection and to resolve the problems through bringing man back to the 
world, through its emphasis on lived experience, the body, affect, ethical 
entanglements etc. Very much echoing the approach of Bloch, cited earlier, 
leading posthumanist theorist Rosi Braidotti, seeks to develop a 
posthumanism that can ‘actualize the virtual possibilities of an expanded, 
relational self that functions in a nature-culture continuum’, expressing an 
‘affirmative, ethical dimension of becoming-posthuman’ as a community 
bound ‘by the compassionate acknowledgement of their interdependence with 
multiple others’ (Braidotti, 2017: p.34; p.39).
Perhaps, in his more recent work, Bruno Latour could be seen to symbolize 
the last gasp of the politics of hope – of the critical attempt to return man to a 
world of meaning - with his conception of the earth in terms of the complex 
adaptive system of Gaia, where there is nothing ‘natural’ about the interactive 
agencies of the planet, which together produced life (Latour, 2013: pp.62-3). 
For Latour, like Bonneuil and Fressoz, the problem is the divide between 
culture and nature: a product of modernist human invention (2013: p.67). Like 
other critical theorists, and despite his claim that ‘critique has run out of 
steam’ (2004), Latour seeks to heal the rift that modernity is held to have 
opened and restore the ‘Earthbound’ to their true home (2013). 
I wish to set these theorists, who maintain that hope is possible and 
necessary to confront the challenges of the Anthropocene against those 
theorists who assert a much more affirmative politics of the Anthropocene. 
These theorists, considered in the following section argue that the 
Anthropocene is not a future to come, that must be warded off, but is already 
here, thereby transforming and inverting the hopeful aspirations of critical 
theory. 
8Extinction: After Hope… after Failure…
It is important to emphasize that for those who advocate critical theory and its 
alternative of hope we are still living in the modernist world, one in which hope 
is possible. While critical theorists are clearly critical of the modernist 
episteme they are still anthropocentric or still live in the legacy of modernist 
assumptions in which progress is possible  – they highlight the critique of 
Cartesian rational man in order to have a happy ending – their concern is to 
save humanity and the planet rather than to affirm the Anthropocene (see, for 
example, Burke et al, 2016). The new relational, embodied and entangled 
subject of late modernity, is thus sometimes seen as an extension of the 
modernist will to govern and problem-solve on the basis of intervening, 
adapting and being resilient in the face of non-linear or complex life, which is 
seen to set new norms for governance and problem-solving. This ‘hope’ is 
entirely lacking in some contemporary affirmations of the Anthropocene, at 
home in a world without meaning ‘for us’, where what is important is the lack 
of stable relation and the lack of intentionality. Claire Colebrook would appear 
to hit the nail on the head:
Humanism posits an elevated or exceptional ‘man’ to grant sense to 
existence, then when ‘man’ is negated or removed what is left is the 
human all too human tendency to see the world as one giant 
anthropomorphic self- organizing living body… When man is destroyed to 
yield a posthuman world it is the same world minus humans, a world of 
meaning, sociality and readability yet without any sense of the disjunction, 
gap or limits of the human. (Colebrook, 2014: pp.163-4) 
For Colebrook, these approaches are problematic in that they offer a narrative 
of hope and redemption: after the detour of modernity, man is returned to the 
world. In which case, the rejection of the foundational assumptions of 
modernity would still make hope possible: man could still find other modes of 
reasoning in the world. Colebrook asserts powerfully that:
The problem with humanism, so it seems, is that it is deemed to be 
rather inhuman. The Cartesian subject of calculative reason, along with 
computational theories of mind or representation, including both older 
humanisms of man as supreme moral animal and posthumanisms 
envisioning a disembodied world of absolute mastery, cannot cope with the 
complexity and dynamism of affective life. (2014: p.173)
The response to the Anthropocene would, for critical theory, be that of hope – 
to continue to counterpose the present reality to a metaphysics of harmony 
and conciliation, a secular vision of heaven on earth – and thus to learn our 
lesson and to assert ‘never again’ on the basis of overcoming modernity’s 
detachment from entangled and affective life. ‘All our talk of mitigation and 
stability maintains a notion of stabilized nature, a nature that is ideally there 
for us and cyclically compatible with production’ (Colebrook, 2017: p.18). The 
affirmation of the Anthropocene is, in this respect, the inverse of critical 
approaches to hope. For affirmative approaches the slogan of ‘never again’ 
9still places the human at the centre of the world and still promises hope. 
‘Never again’ is always therefore just the prelude to the next hubristic 
assertions of human-centred solutions, leading to the next hubris failures and 
disasters and new claims of ‘never again’, in an ever repeating cycle of 
imaginaries of human mastery. 
For affirmative approaches to the Anthropocene, this cycle can be broken, 
and declarations of ‘never again’ become impossible, precisely through the 
imagination of the extinction of the human as a securing subject. As Audra 
Mitchell states, it is ‘because IR [international relations] is so invested in 
human survival that it renders the assumption of its possibility unquestionable 
— and therefore renders extinction unthinkable’ (Mitchell, 2017: p.12). 
Following Colebrook, she argues that rather than seeing the problems as 
solvable on the basis of alternative forms of securing, it is the drive to secure 
itself which is problematic; ‘only questioning the dogma of survival can enable 
us to critique this condition, and possibly (although not necessarily) to 
transcend it’ (2017: p.17). A very similar position is offered by Madeleine 
Fagan, who argues:
Ecology offers a reordering of the world, a recreation of the world as a 
whole, a neutralizing of the threat to logic and sense posed by the 
Anthropocene... This matters for thinking about security because to give 
the modern subject a home is to secure it; it is to reproduce the claims 
about universality and particularity that constitute the modern subject. 
(2017: p.308)
Those theorists, who affirm the Anthropocene, challenge international 
relations’ discourses of security and strategic thinking at the most 
fundamental level of the subject of security itself. Even ecological thinking, 
while it sometimes challenges modernist assumptions of technological 
solutions, still seeks to secure the human against the world and is thus seen 
to be precisely part of the problem that needs to be overcome.
Theorists who seek to positively affirm the Anthropocene can be seen as 
completing the process of the rejection of modernist and Enlightenment 
thought but through the inversion of the Frankfurt School’s critical project of 
hope. The Frankfurt School was caught in the trap of modernist thinking, in 
that they looked for hope in the world rather than looking to the world to 
critique the possibility of hope. Thus the rise of affirmative and radical ‘post-
critical’ approaches to the Anthropocene, which seek to avoid this trap of still 
clinging to hope – seeking to repeat the subject-centred attempt to ‘restore’ 
humanity to a world of meaning. It is for this reason that the conceptual focus 
upon extinction is often seen as so important, in assuring a world without 
hope, and thereby freeing, as Mitchell argues, ‘the political possibilities of 
becoming [that] are precluded by the imperative to survive “as we are” at all 
costs’, enabling ‘new modes of ethico-political action and forms of life’ (2017: 
p.18).
The affirmative politics of the Anthropocene is thus an inversion of the critical 
focus upon finding hope or meaning in the world, instead seeking to push or 
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enlarge the rift between the human and the world. The rift is naturalised or 
reified: the world is not and never was there for us, so there can be no hope of 
healing or of overcoming it. There can be no basis for hope. It is precisely 
hope - the flight from reality of the destruction wrought by modernity - that the 
Anthropocene is held to bring to an end (Latour, 2010: pp.485-6).
Humanity can no longer ‘progress’ in line with the imaginaries of critical 
thought if the world is no longer seen to be there for our benefit; to provide us 
with hope or meaning. For affirmative approaches, the world is not a set of 
scientific and political puzzles set for us to solve; it is no longer ‘all about us’ – 
i.e. about what cultures, beliefs, politics, institutions, policies, education 
systems etc. are better to access the world of reason and progress. Without a 
world that is there for our benefit, problems can no longer be understood as 
epistemological: problems of the social, cultural, economic or political barriers 
to our knowing and understanding. The flip side of this is that the modernist or 
Enlightenment drive to separate the subject from the object of knowledge is 
revealed to be an error or mistake only in so far as it has not been pushed far 
enough. There is no such thing as an Enlightenment subject – a subject that 
imagines itself as separate to other beings, somehow capable of eventually 
building up more and more universal knowledge of an external world so as to 
control, direct and to dominate this world in order to live happily ever after. 
There is no world ‘for us’, no separate subject and no hope for a happy 
ending. As Ray Brassier (2007: p.25) puts it: ‘Science subtracts nature from 
experience, the better to uncover the objective void of being.’ The only thing 
certain is the ‘necessity’ of contingency itself (Meillassoux, 2008).
Resilience and the Death of Hope
So far the discussion has taken place on the fairly abstract level of political 
and philosophical thought. The claims that hope can no longer play a critical 
role may not necessarily appear obvious, especially for readers in the policy-
making world, in which the crisis of the Anthropocene seems to be a dynamic 
for a wide range of adaptive and critical thinking. The implied death of hope is 
rarely declared in celebratory terms outside of discussion in rarefied academic 
circles. It is for this reason that this final section focuses on the shifting 
problematic of resilience. If any discourse has grown to prominence in the 
shift of policy-making towards a consideration of the Anthropocene, it is that of 
resilience. 
Resilience, for many advocates, begins to stake out a break with modernist or 
‘top-down’ understandings of governance as ‘command-and-control’ and 
instead seeks more processual forms of engagement, working with difference 
and contingency, often from the ‘bottom-up’, seeking to understand processes 
in their emergence and to work with more immanent forms of agency (see 
Chandler, 2014; Grove, 2018). Of interest with regard to the possible death of 
hope and the shift to more affirmative approaches in the Anthropocene has 
been the internal critique of resilience in the policy literature. Two contrasting 
examples will suffice to make the point. 
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Firstly, a critical piece by Lizzie Yarina in the radical urban architecture journal 
Places, titled ‘Your Sea Wall Won’t Save You’, which criticises ‘highly 
engineered, technocratic programmes’ of urban resilience through the building 
of floodwalls and defences (Yarina, 2018). For Yarina, attempts to impose 
‘engineering’ resilience are mistaken in their ‘top-down’ approach of ‘enforcing 
resilience’ (italics in original). Resilience is understood to be ‘enforced’ as 
rather than solving the problem, engineering solutions are seen to be 
promoting unsustainable growth based on massive construction projects to 
keep the status-quo working while not dealing with the ‘root causes’ of 
flooding, soil erosion and groundwater extraction. Referencing Ulrich Beck’s 
conception of ‘risk society’, she notes the recursive nature of the problem, 
whereby resilience, done this way, ‘just makes the situation worse’, through 
favouring ‘hard systems’ of infrastructural control and regulation rather than 
‘soft systems’ capable of adapting to local realities rather than fighting them 
(see also Chandler, 2017). Yarina instead argues for a different resilience, 
‘critical resilience’ which would ‘draw on local vernaculars for living with 
water’. As can be seen clearly, the shifting approach to resilience here 
illustrates the shift from a modernist to a hopeful and more affirmative 
construction of living with the problem rather than trying to fight it. Thereby, 
exploring the local and contextual possibilities revealed by the problem of 
flooding.
A similar discussion can also be seen in more policy science oriented 
journals. One example of this shift, highlighted by the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre, is the idea of the problem of ‘coercive resilience’; again a type of 
resilience which seeks to evade or cover over problems rather than tackle 
them in their immanent forms of emergence (Rist et al, 2014). The group of 
scientists writing on ‘Applying Resilience Thinking to Production Ecosystems’ 
define ‘coerced resilience’ as: ‘Resilience that is created as a result of 
anthropogenic inputs such as labour, energy and technology, rather than 
supplied by the ecological system itself.’ (2014: 3) As the authors state: ‘In the 
context of production systems, coercion of resilience enables the 
maintenance of high levels of production.’ (2014: 3). The authors focus 
specifically on food production, where the addition of nutrients, fertilizer and 
technological aids over the last few hundred years has seen the ‘substitution 
of human and human-made capital for natural capital and processes’ (2014: 
3). Their argument is that although leading to higher levels of production in the 
short-term, in the long-term this process of increasing agricultural productivity 
has been counter-productive as natural processes have become artificial. 
Agricultural resilience is now more difficult as there is much less reliance ‘on 
the maintenance of local ecological processes [which provided]... clearer 
feedbacks regarding proximity to ecological thresholds’ (2014: 4). Not only is 
resilience lost locally but also the reliance on ‘anthropogenic inputs’ sourced 
externally is ‘often at the expense of externalities imposed elsewhere’ (2014: 
4). Rather than human inputs creating resilience to food shortages, 
agricultural productivity increases are seen to be counter-productive, 
undermining natural systems and necessitating continual increases in artificial 
measures seeking to shore up an increasingly non-sustainable status quo.
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In these, increasingly prevalent discourses of resilience, the faith in modernist 
science and technology – in ‘top-down’, ‘anthropogenic’, ‘engineering’ or 
‘technical’ solutions – is displaced through a hope in ‘critical’, ‘local’, ‘natural’ 
and ‘bottom-up’ approaches. My argument is that this attempt to dismiss 
modernist frameworks of problem-solving and to rely on ‘hope’ - as 
constructed in this article, as a critique of Enlightenment assumptions and the 
return of the human to the world in the Anthropocene – is doomed to failure. 
Logically, there is no possibility of developing alternative forms of resilience, 
which can survive this critique. Increasingly it is the case that whatever is 
done to preserve humanity will inevitably be construed to be problematic, 
when humanity is collectively seen to be the problem rather than the solution, 
i.e. in the era of the Anthropocene.
I close this section and this article with one final example regarding resilience, 
Stephanie Wakefield and Bruce Braun’s essay on ‘oystertecture’ or ‘living 
breakwaters’ (2018). This is a study of plans to do resilience the ‘natural’ way, 
following super storm Sandy, by building two miles of oyster reefs off Staten 
Island, New York. Building oyster reefs not only is said to provide a natural 
flood barrier rising and falling with the tide, oysters are also a natural way of 
cleansing pollutants and improving water quality. Thus enrolling nature in 
infrastructure would seem to meet the requirements of ‘critical’ and ‘non-
coercive’ resilience. Except of course this does not and cannot. Oystertecture 
is still doing ‘resilience’ it is attempting to adapt to the changing world in order 
to preserve the productivist and consumptionist way of live of New Yorkers. 
Any imaginary of resilience as ‘hope’: as a ‘natural’ or non-coercive way of 
becoming in harmony as a ‘posthuman’ community bound ‘by the 
compassionate acknowledgement of our interdependence with multiple 
others’ (Braidotti, 2017: p.39), is increasingly seen to be reactionary and 
problematic. Open to the accusation that on behalf of the needs of capital and 
corporations there is a pretence that sea-levels are not rising, that climate 
change is not already here and that the Anthropocene is somehow a condition 
to come. Hope is part of the problem not part of the solution. As Wakefield 
and Braun illustrate, hope cannot be any better than a modernist ‘engineering’ 
or ‘technical’ solution as it still promises salvation. It still promises a world 
different from the one that exists rather than affirming this world. Oystertecture 
is still an attempt to fight the Anthropocene rather than accepting and 
affirming it. Oystertecture provides hope when the critical approach 
increasingly appears to see hope only as the enemy, operating on the side of 
maintaining an unsustainable status quo.
Conclusion
The affirmation of the Anthropocene is precisely the affirmation of this world 
‘after the world’. In the modernist world of reason, there was nothing new or 
creative in the world: the agential power was the human subject’s attempt to 
find or to discover hidden hope or reason in the world. The Anthropocene 
promises a world without the modernist privilege of hope; a world that, in its 
affirmation of what exists, has no more need for hope than for progress 
towards an alternative future. As Claire Colebrook argues, rejecting hope 
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forces us to ‘stay with the trouble’ without ‘bestowing an epic agential power in 
“man”’ (2015: p.176). This is highlighted in comparison with Kantian or critical 
hope, based upon a hidden reason in nature, which enables human discord, 
war and aggression to ultimately tend towards a level of stability and 
harmony: a transcendental telos of progress, which enables order to emerge 
from disharmony and conflict (Colebrook, 2014: p.106). Thus it would appear 
that our contemporary condition expresses both the exhaustion of modernist 
understandings of reason and progress and of critical and post-foundational 
attempts to keep hope alive and to open alternative possibilities. It is not just 
that ‘the end of the world is more easily imaginable than the end of 
capitalism’: it would appear that ‘after the end of the world’ it is no longer 
possible even to imagine any alternative. If these critics are correct, that no 
alternatives are possible, even in the imagination, then hope will have no 
future.
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